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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Lawrence D. Diehl*
I. 1989 LEGISLATION
A. Experimental Family Court
In 1989, the Virginia General Assembly enacted significant legis-
lation authorizing the creation of an experimental family court.'
The experimental program is an attempt to examine the unifica-
tion of the circuit court and the juvenile and domestic relations
district court's jurisdiction of divorce cases. The program's goals
include the elimination of duplicate hearings, the savings of client
costs, and the elimination of de novo appeals.2
Effective January 1, 1990, the legislation provides for the estab-
lishment of designated juvenile and domestic relations district
courts as experimental family courts.3 It further provides for the
selection of two circuit court judges and two juvenile and domestic
relations court judges, chosen equally from rural and urban loca-
tions, to sit as experimental family court judges.4 The Judicial
Council of Virginia shall select the judges.5 The jurisdiction of
these family courts will include those matters set forth in section
16.1-241 of the Code of Virginia, as well as jurisdiction over suits
for divorce, annulment or affirmation of marriages. 6 The experi-
* Director, Marks & Harrison, Hopewell, Virginia; B. A., 1971, Bucknell University; J. D.,
1974, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary; 1988-, Member, Board
of Governors, Family Law Section, Virginia State Bar (1988-89, Chairman, Legislative
Subcommittee).
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-241.1, -296.1, 17-116.05:5, 20-96.1, -96.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
2. See Condo, Board of Governors Letter Regarding the Proposed Family Court, 8 FAM.
L. NEws 22 (1988).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
4. Id. § 20-96.1(C).
5. Id. § 16.1-241.1.
6. Id. In cases of divorces and annulments, the procedure set forth in the legislation pro-
vides for an order of referral by the circuit court to the experimental family court, to be
entered upon the filing of a divorce. The circuit court shall randomly refer to said family
court no less than 20% nor more than 50% of all such cases filed. Process will be issued by
the experimental family court similar to normal procedures used by the circuit court for
such purposes. However, if an objection is filed by either party within twenty-one days of
the service of the bill of complaint, the case shall be returned to the circuit court. The
legislation does not specify in which court such objection must be filed, but implies that the
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mental family court shall thereafter have jurisdiction over all mat-
ters relating to the divorce, including pendente lite hearings and
preliminary motions.7 No case referred to the court shall be re-
ferred to a commissioner in chancery,8 and the evidence shall be
presented ore tenus or by deposition.9 Proceedings shall be con-
ducted as in other suits in equity. The family court shall have all
the powers and authority in cases referred to it as the designated
circuit court would have had in such matters, 0 and shall have the
power to modify or enforce previously entered circuit court
orders."
Appeals from the experimental family court shall go directly to
the Court of Appeals of Virginia.12 This is a significant change
from the traditional concept of de novo appeals from an order of
the juvenile and domestic relations district court to the circuit
court. The appellate jurisdiction of cases from experimental family
courts includes: appeals from divorce or annulment suits; cases
originating in the said court involving custody, visitation, child or
spousal support, and termination of residual parental rights; cases
for the enforcement or modification of a decree transferred to said
court by section 20-79 of the Code of Virginia; ' and any interlocu-
tory decree granting injunctive relief in the above-specified cate-
gory of cases. 4
The authority of the experimental family court to accept new
cases will expire on December 31, 1991,15 with a report of its opera-
objection would be filed in the experimental family court since the case must thereafter "be
returned to the circuit court." See Id. § 20-96.1(D).
7. Id. § 20-96.1(0). All further pleadings and motions shall be filed in the experimental
family court. Id.
8. For a recent analysis of the use of commissioners in chancery in Virginia family law
matters, see Diehl, Use of Commissioners in Chancery For Equitable Distribution Issues:
Results of the 1988 Family Law Section Survey, 9 FAM. L. NEWS 23 (1988-89).
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
10. Id.
11. Id. Although the present expiration date for the experimental family court set forth in
the legislation is December 31, 1991, the said court shall have the power to conclude cases
pending therein and to enforce and modify such final decrees after said expiration date. Id.
§ 20-96.1(D), (F).
12. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-296.1, 17-116.05:5.
13. Id. § 20-79 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
14. Id. § 17-116.05:5 (Cum. Supp. 1989). "All case documents shall be transferred to the
circuit court by January 31, 1992, or at the conclusion of the proceedings, whichever occurs
later." Upon such transfer, the cases will resume their status as cases in the circuit court. Id.
§ 20-96.1(F).
15. Id. § 20-96.1(F).
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tions and its impact on the Commonwealth's judicial system to be
reported by the Judicial Council of Virginia to the Governor and
the General Assembly by December 31, 1992.16
B. Child Support
1. Child Support Guidelines
In response to the federal legislative requirements of the Family
Support Act of 1988,'1 the 1989 General Assembly passed major
changes to the Virginia child support guidelines statutes. The most
significant amendment is the declaration of a "rebuttable pre-
sumption" in any judicial or administrative proceeding for child
support that the amount of the award which would result from the
application of the guidelines set out in section 20-108.2 of the Code
of Virginia shall be the correct amount.' 8 To rebut the presump-
tion, the trial court must make a written finding in the order that
the application of such guidelines would be "unjust" or "inappro-
priate" based upon relevant evidence pertaining to the factors set
forth in sections 20-107.2 and 20-108.1 of the Code of Virginia.19
Such written findings may be "incorporated by reference. ' 2° In ad-
6. Id. § 20-96.2.
17. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 666 to 669
(West Cum. Supp. 1989). This legislation amended the federal Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984 which required each state to establish child support guidelines by Oc-
tober 1, 1987, in order to remain eligible for federal funding for Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305, 1321-22 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). Virginia's child support guidelines complying with this federal leg-
islation were enacted in 1988 and are contained in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1, -108.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1989). See Butler, Domestic Relations: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH.
L. REv. 565 (1988) (summary of Virginia's 1988 child support guidelines legislation).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989). The previous Virginia legislation, en-
acted in 1988, provided merely for the non-binding use of said guidelines by the court. Id.
§§ 20-108.1(B), -108.2(A).
19. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1(B), -108.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989). The federal legislation
does not define the terms "unjust" or "inappropriate", and permits such findings "as deter-
mined under criteria established by the State." Pub. L. No. 100-485, 100 Stat. 2343, 2346
(1988). It would appear that in Virginia, a written finding by the court in a particular case
that the factors set forth either in section 20-107.2 or section 20-108.1(B) would create an
"unjust" or "inappropriate" result will be sufficient to rebut the guideline computations. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1(B), -108(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
20. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1, -108.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989). The mechanics of such incorpo-
ration by reference need not be a burden on the trial court. The mere incorporation by
reference of the checklist on the reverse side of the Child Support Guidelines Reporting
Form, Form DC-638, 7/88, prepared by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of
Virginia and the Department of Social Services, will satisfy the "written finding" require-
ment of the legislation. See id. § 20-108.2(H); see also Richardson, Support Guidelines to
be Rebuttable Presumption, 3 VLW 793, 810 (February 27, 1989) (comments of your
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ministrative proceedings, the Department of Social Services shall
establish child support by using these guidelines.2
The second significant amendment clarifies the relationship be-
tween the computation of child support pursuant to the guidelines
and the computation of spousal support. In defining "gross in-
come" for purposes of guideline computation, spousal support shall
be included in "gross income" only if it is paid pursuant to a pre-
existing order or written agreement.22 Spousal support shall be de-
ducted from the "gross income" of the payor when "paid pursuant
to a pre-existing order or written agreement between the parties to
the present proceeding. '23
Another amendment extends the combined monthly gross in-
come contained in the table in section 20-108.2 of the Code of Vir-
ginia.24 The table now provides for guideline computations based
upon the monthly gross income of both parties of up to$10,000.00.25
A further amendment specifies that "extraordinary medical" ex-
penses include "eyeglasses, prescription medication, prostheses and
mental health services whether provided by a social worker, psy-
chologist, psychiatrist, or counselor.
2 6
Finally, the statute now provides that the review procedure to
determine the adequacy of the child support guidelines and the
effect of the use of the guidelines on the levels of support shall be
author).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
22. Id. § 20-108.2(C). The intent of this amendment as stated by comments on the legisla-
tion at a hearing at the Senate Courts of Justice Committee, General Assembly, February 5,
1989, was to ensure that in a joint or initial hearing on the issues of both child and spousal
support, that child support would be computed first, without adding spousal support to
gross income and thereafter, spousal support would be computed pursuant to section 20-
107.1. The previous definition of "gross income" contained in section 20-108.2 included
spousal support without limitation. This resulted in confusion by some trial courts in com-
puting spousal support first, in order to arrive at a guideline definition of "gross income" for
the recipient spouse and thereafter, the computation of child support. This reversed the
traditional priorities and procedures followed in such cases in Virginia.
23. Id. In the case where spousal support is paid by a payor to a previous or subsequent
spouse, and not pursuant to a pre-existing order or agreement between the same parties to
the present proceeding, such payments can still be a factor to be considered by the trial
court in its determination to rebut the guidelines computation as being "unjust" or "inap-
propriate" in a particular case. Id. § 20-108.1(B)(1) ("Actual monetary support for . . .
other family members or former family members.").
24. Id. § 20-108.2(B).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 20-108.2(D).
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made on July 1, 1990, and every four years thereafter."
2. Child Support for High School Students
Lawmakers modified the authority of the court to order support
for a child over the age of eighteen who is still attending high
school.28 The statute was amended to change the present limitation
of high school "senior" to any high school "student. ' 29 In order to
clarify the court's authority to enter a child support award
pendente lite under the circumstances set forth in said statute, leg-
islation was enacted to specify the court's authority for such orders
pending the suit.30
C. Equitable Distribution
Section 20-107.3(D) was amended to provide that any monetary
award entered pursuant to this subsection shall not be docketed by
the clerk unless the decree so directs.3'
D. Procedure
There are several jurisdictional and procedural changes relevant
to domestic relations proceedings. The most significant amend-
ment concerns the jurisdictional effect of the filing of divorces, af-
firmation of marriages and annulments in the proper venue.32 Sec-
tion 20-96 of the Code of Virginia has been amended to delete the
jurisdictional mandate of filing in such venues,3 3 while section 8.01-
261, of the Code of Virginia, relating to the preferred venue for the
filing of certain actions, has made traditional venues in divorce ac-
27. Id. § 20-108.2(G). This provision is in conformity with the federal legislation con-
tained in section 103(b) of the Family Support Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103(b)
102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (1988).
28. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1989) providing for support to a child no
longer a minor where the child is "(i) a full-time high school student, (ii) not self-supporting
and (iii) living in the home of the parent seeking or receiving child support until such child
reaches the age of nineteen or graduates from high school, whichever first occurs." Id.
29. Id. § 20-107.2(i).
30. Id. § 20-103(v).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(D) (Cum Supp. 1989).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96 (Cum. Supp. 1989). The previous statute has been interpreted
to make mandatory and jurisdictional the filing of divorce cases in the proper venue. See
Colley v. Colley, 204 Va. 225, 129 S.E.2d 630 (1963); Blankenship v. Blankenship, 125 Va.
595, 100 S.E. 538 (1919).
33. Id. § 20-96 (Cum. Supp. 1989). The 1989 amendment deleted the designation of the
first paragraph as subsection A and deleted subsections B and C pertaining to venue and
transfer of suits for annulment, affirmance, or divorce. Id.
1989] 585
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tions a new category of preferred venue.3 4 The effect of such legis-
lation will be to legitimize divorces obtained in courts where a di-
vorce has been filed in an improper venue, but no objection or
transfer motion has been made by the parties.36
Section 16.1-296 of the Code of Virginia was amended to clarify
that where any case has been "transferred" from a circuit court to
a juvenile court, and an appeal is taken from an order of the juve-
nile court, the appeal shall be taken to the circuit court which had
original jurisdiction of the case. 6
The juvenile court's authority to transfer the venue of a case
where appropriate pursuant to section 16.1-243(B) of the Code of
Virginia was extended to those cases in which a case, pertaining to
support, maintenance, care or custody, was transferred to said ju-
venile court pursuant to section 20-79(c) of the Code of Virginia.3 7
In clarifying the concurrent jurisdiction of the juvenile and cir-
cuit courts, after a suit for divorce is filed, section 16.1-244(A) of
the Code of Virginia was amended to provide that the juvenile
courts shall retain jurisdiction to enforce its valid order for any
period during which the order was in effect.38 Legislation was fur-
ther enacted providing that circuit courts and juvenile courts shall
have concurrent original jurisdiction of cases relating to the issue
of parentage of a child. 9
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Equitable Distribution of Marital Property
1. Classification of Property
The Court of Appeals of Virginia continued its broad expansion
of the transmutation doctrine in the case of Ellington v. Elling-
ton.40 In Ellington, the husband owned fifty percent of the stock in
a closely held corporation at the time of the marriage. Over the
34. Id. § 8.01-261(19). Also amended was section 8.01-259. The 1989 amendment repealed
subdivision (b) pertaining to domestic relations proceedings. Id. § 8.01-259.
35. Id. §§ 8.01-264, -265.
36. Id. § 16.1-296. The previous statutory language relating to such appeals was limited to
cases which had been "referred" from a circuit court to a juvenile court. Id. § 16.1-296
(Repl. Vol. 1988).
37. Id. §§ 16.1-243(B)(5), 20-79(c).
38. Id. § 16.1-244(A).
39. Id. §§ 16.1-241(Q), 20-49.2.
40. 8 Va. App. 48, 378 S.E.2d 626 (1989).
586 [Vol. 23:581
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course of the marriage, the corporation increased in value from
$231,000 to $449,800. The trial court ruled that the value of the
stock at the time of the marriage was the husband's separate prop-
erty, but the increase in value was marital property.41 In accord
with Smoot v. Smoot42 and Lambert v. Lambert,43 the court of ap-
peals reversed the trial court by holding that such a dual classifica-
tion was erroneous, and that where separate property is commin-
gled with marital property, it loses its separate character and the
entire property is transmuted into marital property. 44 The court
further reaffirmed its Lambert dicta by specifically holding that
separate property may be transmuted into marital property by the
active efforts of the parties during the marriage. 4 The court stated
that such a holding was consistent with the unitary concept of
property and the goal of increasing the pool of marital property to
provide the opportunity of a more equitable property division.46
The Ellington opinion further held that the trial court erred in
awarding the future profits of the husband's other business inter-
ests as part of the marital award where there was no present value
to such business.47 However, the awarding of one-half of the net
value of the parties' jointly owned residence over and above the
41. Id. at 50-52, 378 S.E.2d at 627-28. The court of appeals noted in its opinion that the
trial court's ruling had been made prior to the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in
Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987) that property cannot consist of a por-
tion that is separate and a portion that is marital. 8 Va. App. at 52-53, 378 S.E.2d at 628-29.
42. 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
43. 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988).
44. Ellington, 8 Va. App. at 58, 378 S.E.2d at 632.
45. Id. at 53, 378 S.E.2d at 629. Because the trial court's record did not contain sufficient
findings as to whether the wife's active efforts were sufficient to permit a finding of trans-
mutation, the case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of the issue. Id. at 54-
55, 378 S.E.2d at 629-30. However, the court of appeals did not articulate the evidentiary
standard that would be required to make such a finding. Guidance may be obtained on the
issue by the Illinois case law upon which the Smoot decision was based. The Illinois decision
of In Re Marriage of Olson, 96 Ill. 2d 432, 451 N.E.2d 825 (1983) required a finding of
"sufficiently significant" efforts before a finding of transmutation can be made. See Diehl, 1
FAMt. L. NEWS ALERT (April 1989).
46. Ellington, 8 Va. App. at 54, 378 S.E.2d at 629.
47. Id. at 55, 378 S.E.2d at 630. Supporting its ruling, the court of appeals cited Hodges v.
Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 347 S.E.2d 134 (1986), which held that where property is essentially
of no value, it is inappropriate to consider it as a basis for a monetary award. Id. at 515, 347
S.E.2d at 138. This part of the Ellington opinion would also appear consistent with the
marital partnership theory expressed by the court of appeals in Reid v. Reid, 7 Va. App.
553, 375 S.E.2d 533 (1989) where the court stated, "It is axiomatic that whatever the future
may hold for either of the parties has no bearing on the issue of the appropriate division of
what has been accumulated by their contributions during the marriage." Id. at 565, 375
S.E.2d at 540.
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trial date value was not erroneous since the potential for partition
and sale of said home still remained. 8
2. Valuation
In Trivett v. Trivett,49 the husband executed a note payable to
his grandparents as consideration for an interest in a commercial
building. The note was unsecured, but after the filing of the di-
vorce action, the husband executed a deed of trust on the commer-
cial property securing the note. The husband contended that the
trial court disregarded the lien balance in valuing the commercial
building and in computing its monetary award to the wife.5' The
court of appeals held that where an encumbrance on marital prop-
erty is created in anticipation of divorce and deliberately made to
reduce or eliminate the value of such property in order to reduce
or eliminate a monetary award to the other spouse, the trial court
can disregard the lien and include the unencumbered value of the
asset within the "pool" of marital property from which it deter-
mines the amount of the award.51 The case was remanded to the
trial court for specific consideration of the issue since the record
contained no determinations related to such necessary findings.
The issue of the proper valuation date of a pension was ad-
dressed in Kaufman v. Kaufman.52 Despite the husband's conten-
tion that he had made substantial contributions to his pension
plan after the separation of the parties, the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's use of the date of the evidentiary hearing as
48. Ellington, 8 Va. App. at 57-58, 378 S.E.2d at 631.
49. 7 Va. App. 148, 371 S.E.2d 560 (1980).
50. Id. at 150-51, 371 S.E.2d at 561.
51. Id. at 155, 371 S.E.2d at 564. The court of appeals carefully distinguished its ruling
from Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 347 S.E.2d 134 (1986) where the court had ruled
that where marital property was encumbered with indebtedness which equaled or exceeded
its value, then it had no value and could not be the basis of a monetary award. No evidence
or allegations were presented to show that the debt was created as a sham or as an attempt
to frustrate the purposes of section 20-107.3 of the Code of Virginia. The Hodges decision
concerned valuation of marital property, not classification. Trivett, 7 Va. App. at 151, 371
S.E.2d at 561.
In dissent, Judge Coleman argued that section 20-107.3 did not contemplate a require-
ment that the court make the finding required by the majority opinion. He argued that
whether a debt was secured or unsecured, it still must be considered by the court pursuant
to section 20-107.3(E)(7), and that a reduction in value due to secured debts could unjustly
deprive a spouse of a fair monetary award. Trivett, 7 Va. App. at 156-60, 374 S.E.2d at 564-
66 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
52. 7 Va. App. 488, 375 S.E.2d 374 (1988).
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the proper valuation date."
Holmes v. Holmes54 addressed the proper method of valuation of
a military pension. In Holmes, the court of appeals restated its
holding in Sawyer v. Sawyer"5 that a military pension is subject to
equitable distribution under Virginia's statutory scheme. The court
further approved the use of the annuity table contained in section
55-269.11s of the Code of Virginia as a proper method to determine
the present value of the disposable portion of the pension.57
3. Monetary Award and Statutory Factors
The issue of the monetary award and the application of the fac-
tors in section 20-107.351 of the Code of Virginia in establishing
such an award in equitable distribution proceedings was one of the
most active areas of court of appeals decisions over the past year.
In Pledger v. Pledger,5 the court of appeals held that the accrual
of interest on the payment of a lump sum retirement benefit paya-
ble to the wife begins only upon the date the payment becomes
due and continues until the date paid. The wife's argument that
the term "judgment," as used in the parties' separation agreement,
53. Id. at 499-500, 375 S.E.2d at 380. This was held to be consistent with the ruling in
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 133, 355 S.E.2d 18 (1987). The court in Kaufman recog-
nized the statutory amendment to section 20-107.3(A) of the Code of Virginia, effective July
1, 1988, requiring the use of "the date of the evidentiary hearing" as the proper valuation
date. For current cases, however, it is submitted that the amendment to section 20-107.3(G)
of the Code of Virginia also effective July 1, 1988, would apply and would limit the spouse's
share to the "marital share" of such pension, as defined in said subsection. VA. CODE ANN. §
20-107.3(G) (Cum. Supp. 1989). See Astor v. Gross, 7 Va. App. 1, 371 S.E.2d 833 (1988).
54. 7 Va. App. 472, 375 S.E.2d 387 (1988).
55. 1 Va. App. 75, 335 S.E.2d 277 (1985).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-269.1 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
57. Holmes, 7 Va. App. at 479, 375 S.E.2d at 391. The importance of this specific ruling is
arguably reduced based upon the amendment to section 20-107.3(G), effective July 1, 1988,
which removes the need to present evidence of the present value of a pension. This amend-
ment permits the trial court to award a percentage of the marital share of such pension,
vested or unvested, when actually received by the party against whom an award is made. VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G) (Cum Supp. 1989).
The court also addressed the husband's contention that the trial court improperly in-
cluded the disability retirement portion in its monetary and support award. While not spe-
cifically ruling on the issue of whether disability pay is properly divisible pursuant to Vir-
ginia law, the court approved the trial court's methodology in computing the net pay which
excluded the disability component. Holmes, 7 Va. App. at 480-81, 375 S.E.2d at 392-93. The
court further held that the husband had not met his burden of rebutting the presumption
that the monies placed in his bank accounts and commingled with other funds were not
marital property. Id. at 486, 375 S.E.2d at 395.
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
59. 6 Va. App. 627, 371 S.E.2d 43 (1988).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
should be construed to permit the accrual of interest from the date
of the entry of a final decree was rejected.6
One of the most anticipated opinions of the past year was the
court of appeals second decision in Booth v. Booth. 1 The court
first held that the equitable distribution statutes apply to all ac-
tions filed after its effective date, regardless of when the cause of
action arose or when marital property was acquired.2 The court
then held that the trial court may consider the "waste,' '63 or "nega-
tive" contribution of marital assets, as a factor in its monetary
award pursuant to section 20-107.3(E)(2) of the Code of Virginia. 4
Finally, consistent with numerous previous court of appeals deci-
sions, 5 the court held that the trial court erred in ordering the
wife to transfer her interest in the jointly owned marital home to
the husband.
Addressing the issue of the proper consideration by the trial
court of the section 20-107.3(E) factors, the court of appeals in As-
tor v. Gross66 held that an award of thirty-five percent of the mari-
tal property and twenty percent of the husband's pension to the
wife, was not erroneous. Citing Papuchis v. Papuchis,67 the court
reaffirmed the principle that Virginia's equitable distribution stat-
ute does not contain a presumption favoring the equal division of
property.6 8 Where the record evidenced a full consideration of all
factors by the trial court, including the substantial monetary con-
tributions of the husband, the percentage award was proper.69 The
60. Id. at 629, 371 S.E.2d at 45.
61. 7 Va. App. 22, 371 S.E.2d 569 (1988). The earlier opinion rendered in this matter on
February 2, 1988 was vacated on February 26, 1988 after certain issues had been withdrawn
by the appellant after oral argument. Id. at 24, 371 S.E.2d at 571.
62. Id. at 27, 371 S.E.2d at 572. The court stated that the intent of the General Assembly
was shown from the language of the statute and the consequences of the act. To hold other-
wise would require application of "outmoded" principles of laws to cases, a result the legis-
lature could not have intended. Id. at 26, 371 S.E.2d at 571.
63. "Waste" is defined as "the dissipation of marital funds in anticipation of divorce or
separation for a purpose unrelated to the marriage and in derogation of the marital relation-
ship at a time when the marriage is in jeopardy." Id. at 27, 371 S.E.2d at 572.
64. The court specifically stated that "equity can only be accomplished if the party who
last had the funds is held accountable for them." Id. at 28, 371 S.E.2d at 573.
65. See, e.g., Venable v. Venable, 2 Va. App. 178, 342 S.E.2d 646 (1986). But see the
amendments to § 20-107.3 effective July 1, 1988 (permitting the court to order such a trans-
fer or division in certain circumstances).
66. 7 Va. App. 1, 371 S.E.2d 833 (1988).
67. 2 Va. App. 130, 341 S.E.2d 829 (1986).
68. 7 Va. App. at 8, 371 S.E.2d at 837.
69. Id. at 6, 371 S.E.2d at 836. The court reversed the pension award, however, due to the
erroneous date of valuation which was used by the trial court. The proper trial date was that
[Vol. 23:581
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court of appeals further affirmed the trial court's discretion per-
mitting the expert testimony of a certified public accountant to
value the husband's orthodontist business, holding that the admis-
sion of such testimony is within the discretion of the trial court.70
In Pommerenke v. Pommerenke, 1 the court of appeals upheld
the trial court's monetary award of the total amount of the hus-
band's down payment of separate funds towards the marital resi-
dence, holding that while the court is not required to reimburse
such a contribution, it is not error to do so where all section 20-
107.3(E) of the Code of Virginia factors are considered by the trial
court.72 The court further reaffirmed Virginia's law that in the eq-
uitable distribution of property no "equal" division presumption
exists, but that an initial assumption of equality when used as a
''starting point" in the court's evaluation of the statutory factors is
proper.73
The mere fact that a party's financial condition is no worse when
the marriage is dissolved than when the party entered into a mar-
riage was held to be an improper basis for the denial of a monetary
award in Keyser v. Keyser.7 4 The court of appeals in Keyser stated
the mere fact that the marriage was of short duration and that the
wife had maintained her net worth were insufficient grounds to
deny her a share in the husband's pension earned during the mar-
riage. The court was required to consider all statutory factors and
the case was remanded for the trial court's consideration of such
factors. 75
In Kaufman v. Kaufman, 6 the wife had retained ownership of
closest to the equitable distribution hearing, rather than one month prior to the date of the
parties' separation. Id. at 5, 371 S.E.2d at 835; see also Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 133,
355 S.E.2d 18 (1987) (where the court promulgated guidelines for determining the date of
valuation).
70. Astor, 7 Va. App. at 6-7, 371 S.E.2d at 837. Astor also upheld the trial court's author-
ity to value a business at a sum basically halfway between two conflicting valuations. Where
faced with conflicting values of $31,000 and $280,000 on the business, the court's finding of a
value of $121,000 for the business was upheld in this opinion. Id. at 9, 371 S.E.2d at 837.
71. 7 Va. App. 241, 372 S.E.2d 630 (1988).
72. Id. at 251, 372 S.E.2d at 635. The court of appeals clarified that Smoot v. Smoot, 233
Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987), did not mandate a reimbursement of separate funds which
are transmuted to the "pool" of marital assets, but that restoration of such funds may be
proper in a case to fashion an ultimate equitable award. Id.
73. Id. at 250, 372 S.E.2d at 634-35. But see supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
74. 7 Va. App. 405, 374 S.E.2d 698 (1988).
75. Id. at 414, 374 S.E.2d at 703.
76. 7 Va. App. 488, 375 S.E.2d 374 (1988).
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marital property, both realty and personalty, she received during
the marriage. The trial court ordered the husband to pay the wife
a monetary award equal to one-half of the value of the equity of
such property. The court of appeals reversed this award, stating as
follows:
The question we must now resolve is whether the trial court may
require husband to pay a sum equal to one-half the value of marital
property given to wife when she retains ownership of the items dur-
ing the marriage. We hold that it may not. The primary objective of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative
intent. Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337,
338 (1983). The legislature intended to provide that all marital
property be considered in making a monetary award but it did not
intend that a spouse receive an award which included a percentage
of the value of property he or she separately owned. To sustain the
trial court on this record we would have to declare that the legisla-
ture intended husband to pay wife a monetary award equal to an
additional fifty percent of the value of the gifts given her by him
during the marriage, the ownership of which she retains. We decline
to give Code § 20-107.3 a construction which would result in that
inequity.77
The court of appeals further noted that where the record lacked
any justification for the disproportionate award made by the trial
court, the award must be reversed and remanded for further
consideration. 78
In one of the most interesting opinions relating to the trial
court's proper application of the statutory factors in fashioning a
monetary award, the court of appeals in Reid v. Reid 7 held that
the earning capacity of one spouse or the future ability of a spouse
to acquire property or a consideration of a spouse's future housing
needs are not proper factors to be considered in making a mone-
tary award. 0 The court's opinion was based upon both the clear
language of the statutory factors set out in the code,81 as well as
the marital partnership theory of equitable distribution. As to the
latter, the court stated as follows:
77. Id. at 496-97, 375 S.E.2d at 378.
78. Id. at 498, 375 S.E.2d at 379.
79. 7 Va. App. 553, 375 S.E.2d 533 (1989).
80. Id. at 565, 375 S.E.2d at 540. The court of appeals specifically rejected the wife's
contention that such factors are proper for consideration under section 20-107.3(E)(11). Id.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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Specifically, we hold that Code § 20-107.3(E)(11) does not contem-
plate consideration of earning capacity of one spouse and support
needs of the other spouse, which are expressly embodied in Code §
20-107.1 and are more appropriately determined under the latter
statute. Code § 20-107.3 provides for the equitable distribution of
the accumulated marital wealth between the marital parties; it does
not contemplate consideration of the future ability of one spouse to
accumulate what will be separate property or the future needs of the
other spouse. In short, the marital partnership notion terminates
with the termination of the marriage and whatever marital wealth
has been accumulated is to be equitably distributed at that time. It
is axiomatic that whatever the future may hold for either of the par-
ties has no bearing on the issue of the appropriate division of what
has been accumulated by their contributions during the marriage. s2
4. Consideration of Fault
This year in the area of equitable distribution, the court of ap-
peals, in Astor v. Gross,s3 held that circumstances leading to the
dissolution of the marriage, but having no effect on the marital
property, its value or otherwise, are not relevant to determining
the monetary award and may not be considered.s4 In Astor, the
wife claimed that the trial court erroneously refused to permit her
to amend her bill of complaint to add counts of adultery by her
husband with seven different persons. The court of appeals held
that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to
permit the amended bill of complaint because the allegations of
marital misconduct have no relation to the value of the parties'
assets and the court had generally considered fault in its award.
The court of appeals, by implication, held that the effects of the
misconduct on the "economic consequences" of the parties must be
alleged to justify such a consideration by the trial court.85
82. Reid, 7 Va. App. at 565, 375 -S.E.2d at 540. Legislation in other states specifically
includes these types of factors as proper consideration in equitable distribution divisions.
See, e.g., Wisconsin's statutory provision, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981 & Cum.
Supp. 1988) permitting the court's consideration of the future housing needs of the custo-
dial spouse and children.
83. 7 Va. App. 1, 371 S.E.2d 833 (1988).
84. Id. at 5-6, 371 S.E.2d at 836. The court stressed the marital partnership theory and
said the factor of dissolution as contained in section 20-107.3(E)(5) relates to "economic"
fault, with an equitable economic division of the property being the goal and policy of such
proceedings. Id. at 5, 371 S.E.2d at 836.
85. Id. at 6, 371 S.E.2d at 837.
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5. Method of Distribution
In Fitchett v. Fitchett,88 the court of appeals addressed the evi-
dentiary requirement to permit entry of an order of partition of
marital property in equitable distribution proceedings. While rec-
ognizing the authority of the court to partition marital property,
the court of appeals held that there must be evidentiary findings in
the record to justify such authority in accordance with normal par-
tition suit procedures.8 7 The court of appeals further ruled that it
was an error for the trial court to defer the partition sale of the
residence in order to provide a residence for the wife and her chil-
dren. Absent specific statutory authority authorizing such a defer-
ral, the trial court could not make such an order in a partition
suit.18
6. Procedural Aspects
In Gologanoff v. Gologanoff,89 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the parties were still required to present evidence on the
classification and value of all other property of the parties as a
condition to the equitable distribution of the disputed property
where the sole property in dispute was a military retirement plan
of the husband. The parties had entered into a written separation
agreement which settled all issues except the pension. The trial
court refused to grant the wife's request for the equitable distribu-
tion of the pension, since the evidence on all other properties was
lacking. 0 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding
86. 6 Va. App. 562, 370 S.E.2d 318 (1988).
87. Id. at 565, 370 S.E.2d at 320. The court of appeals, consistent with Morris v. Morris, 3
Va. App. 303, 349 S.E.2d 661 (1986), recognized that the general partition procedures set
forth in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-81 to -93 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1988) applied to
section 20-107.3 dealing with equitable distribution procedures. See the amendments to sec-
tion 20-107.3(C), effective July 1, 1988 permitting the division or transfer of jointly owned
property, or the sale thereof "[b]y private sale by the parties, through such agent as the
court shall direct, or by public sale as the court shall direct without the necessity for parti-
tion." Id. This amendment provides alternative methods of disposing of jointly owned mari-
tal properties in lieu of partition, but would not remove the evidentiary requirements of
Fitchett where partition is still desired by the parties.
88. Id. at 566, 370 S.E.2d at 320. Such legislative authority is not contained in section 20-
107.3(E) factors in Virginia, but is contained in the statutory schemes of many other states.
Wisconsin, for example, permits the court to consider the "desirability of awarding the fam-
ily home or the right to live therein for a reasonable period to the party having custody of
any children." WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
89. 6 Va. App. 340, 369 S.E.2d 446 (1988).
90. The trial court relied on section 20-107.3(A) which requires the court to determine the
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
based on the lack of such evidence. The court in Gologanoff fur-
ther held that the wife's request for a determination of marital
property rights filed by a separate motion within the time period
for a response to the husband's bill of complaint was sufficient to
permit the court to consider such an issue. The failure to include
such a request in her answer and cross-bill was not fatal.91
The court of appeals held in Kleinfield v. Veruki92 that there
was no authority to award spousal support or make an equitable
distributioi1 award where the trial court determined that an alleged
marriage between the parties was void.
B. Divorce
1. In General
Interpreting the proper place of last cohabitation between the
parties was addressed by the court of appeals in Rock v. Rock.9 3
The parties spent the majority of their time in Middlesex County,
which was their primary residence. However, they had also occu-
pied a condominium that they owned in Richmond, where the par-
ties had been living at the time of their separation.94 Reversing the
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond's dismissal of the case, the
court of appeals held that the term "last cohabited" meant the lo-
cation where the parties last dwelled together under the same roof
with more or less permanency. 95 The "place of last cohabitation"
was not determined by where the parties had their last sexual rela-
tions.96 Therefore, since the parties had "last lived together" in
their condominium in Richmond, the City of Richmond was the
proper forum for the suit.97
"ownership and value of all property." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
91. 6 Va. App. at 347-48, 369 S.E.2d at 450. The court of appeals looked at the substance
of the pleading as in compliance with the intent of section 20-107.3 in "requesting" the
equitable distribution of the property. The court stated that "to hold otherwise would be to
put form over substance, which we refuse to do." Id. at 348, 369 S.E.2d at 450.
92. 7 Va. App. 183, 372 S.E.2d 407 (1988).
93. 7 Va. App. 198, 372 S.E.2d 211 (1988).
94. The issue was the proper jurisdiction of the court for purposes of divorce actions pur-
suant to section 20-96(B) of the Code of Virginia, which states, in part, that a suit for di-
vorce must be brought in the county or corporation in which the parties last cohabited. The
court of appeals noted that the proper filing in such a venue was mandatory in divorce
proceedings. Rock, 7 Va. App. at 201, 372 S.E.2d at 213 (citing Netzer v. Reynolds, 231 Va.
444, 345 S.E.2d 291 (1986)). See, however, the amendment to section 20-96(B) effective July
1, 1989 making such choice of venue preferred pursuant to section 8.01-261, et seq, but not
mandatory, thus changing the practical impact of the Rock case.
95. 7 Va. App. at 201, 372 S.E.2d at 213.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 202, 372 S.E.2d at 214.
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In Kleinfield v. Veruki, 5 the validity of a marriage was the basis
for the denial of a divorce petition. The court of appeals found
that the wife's second marriage was bigamous and void where she
had previously entered into a voidable, but not void, "green card
marriage"99 in New Jersey. Since under Virginia law any marriage
entered into prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage is void,
the wife's petition for divorce would be dismissed. 10
2. Adultery
Three opinions have been rendered by the Court of Appeals of
Virginia over the past year which have addressed the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of adultery.
In Thompson v. Thompson, 10 the court of appeals held that the
testimony of a private investigator relating to one overnight obser-
vation, when combined with further evidence that the man and
woman held themselves out as husband and wife, that the man ex-
ecuted a joint lease for the woman's residence, and that the man
paid the woman's telephone bill and possessed a mailbox key, sup-
ported the commissioner's finding of adultery.'0 2 While restating
the rule that the standard of proof in adultery cases is "clear and
convincing"' 03 evidence, the court of appeals found that the evi-
dence in the record was "substantial, competent and credible" to
support the adultery finding. 04
The court of appeals continued its realistic approach to the suffi-
ciency of proof of adultery in Pommerenke v. Pommerenke.0 5 The
wife in Pommerenke admitted committing adultery, but argued
98. 7 Va. App. 183, 372 S.E.2d 407 (1988).
99. The wife had married one William Garcia to permit him to obtain naturalized citizen
status in the United States. The trial court had ruled such marriage voidable, rather than
void. The court of appeals agreed and interpreted New Jersey law as permitting ratification
of such a marriage. Since the prior marriage was voidable, but not void, a valid New Jersey
marriage existed, thus triggering the application of Virginia's law that a subsequent mar-
riage entered into prior to dissolution of a prior marriage is a nullity. Id. at 187-89, 372
S.E.2d at 409-10.
100. Id. at 190, 372 S.E.2d at 411.
101. 6 Va. App. 277, 367 S.E.2d 747 (1988).
102. Id. at 280, 367 S.E.2d at 749.
103. Id. (citing Coe v. Coe, 225 Va. 616, 303 S.E.2d 923 (1983)).
104. Id.
105. 7 Va. App. 241, 372 S.E.2d 630 (1988).
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that the evidence of diary entries and observations of her sun-
bathing topless with the alleged paramour, who was nude or in his
underwear, were insufficient corroboration to permit a finding of
adultery.108 The court stated that the purpose of corroboration was
to avoid collusion, and that since no evidence of collusion was in
the record, a "common sense approach"'0 7 to the sufficiency of the
evidence adequately established the adultery.
Finally, in Derby v. Derby,08 the court of appeals held that, al-
though the testimony of a private investigator should be carefully
scrutinized where it is offered to prove adultery, the credibility and
weight of such testimony is for the trial court's proper evalua-
tion.10 9 Where the evidence showed that the wife and paramour
spent several nights together in the same house and behaved affec-
tionately in public, the evidence was credible and supported the
finding of adultery despite the wife's denials. 1 0
3. Desertion and Cruelty
Referring to the rule as an "outmoded expectation," the Court of
Appeals of Virginia, in Kerr v. Kerr,"' abrogated the principle that
a wife must follow her husband to his new home or risk being
found to have deserted the marriage. The evidence established
that the husband had moved from Chesapeake to Fredericksburg
in 1985 at his employer's request. The wife refused to move to the
husband's new residence and filed for divorce on the grounds of
constructive desertion." 2 Carefully distinguishing between the jus-
tification for leaving a marital home"13 and the misconduct neces-
106. The court of appeals rejected the wife's argument that this was a normal custom for
a Dutchwoman and should not imply any wrongdoings. In an almost humorous analysis, the
court stated that while her sunbathing "topless" may be a custom practiced without objec-
tion in foreign countries, the court was unaware of any "custom that would explain Van
Weel's presumption that he could feel free to be in his 'underwear' or nude in the presence
of the host's wife and in the absence of the host." Id. at 246, 372 S.E.2d at 632-33.
107. Id. at 246, 372 S.E.2d at 632.
108. 8 Va. App. 19, 378 S.E.2d 74 (1989).
109. Id. at 24, 378 S.E.2d at 76.
110. Id.
111. 6 Va. App. 620, 371 S.E.2d 30 (1988).
112. The wife specifically alleged that the relationship of the parties had deteriorated
prior to their separation, that they slept in different rooms, that husband would go out
every night and return intoxicated, and that he frequently profanely insulted her. Id. at 622,
371 S.E.2d at 30.
113. See, e.g., Rowand v. Rowand, 215 Va. 344, 210 S.E.2d 149 (1974); Brawand v. Bra-
wand, 1 Va. App. 305, 338 S.E.2d 651 (1985).
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sary to establish grounds for a divorce, 114 the court held that such
standards would also be applied to a spouse who refuses to move
from the marital home when the other spouse, because of a job
opportunity, establishes a new home. Whether desertion has oc-
curred depends upon the justification for one spouse's decision to
establish a new residence, and the other spouse's refusal to fol-
low." The court upheld the trial court's finding that the wife, due
to the husband's conduct, was justified in not joining him in his
new marital abode."16
In Dexter v. Dexter,1 7 the court of appeals held that the evi-
dence was insufficient to establish the desertion of the husband by
the wife. The facts showed that the wife had asked for a separation
and had secured an apartment for the husband. The husband
agreed to move into the apartment because he did not want the
wife to undergo stress and because it was the "gentlemanly thing"
to do."18 The court carefully distinguished between the desire to
separate and the intent to "desert" the marriage,"' and found that
the record did not support the husband's allegations that the wife's
conduct was a withdrawal of all marital duties or responsibili-
ties.12 0 The court found that the evidence established that the par-
ties had separated by mutual agreement.' 2 '
Alcoholism, as it relates to a finding of cruelty and constructive
desertion, was the issue in Seehorn v. Seehorn.22 In Seehorn, the
wife left the marital abode allegedly due to the alcoholism of her
husband. 23 However, the court of appeals held that the mere evi-
dence of alcoholism, as a matter of law, was insufficient to prove
that the cohabitation of the parties was unsafe, or that the life and
health of the wife was endangered. Thus, the wife failed to meet
her burden of proof on the issue of constructive desertion. 24
114. See, e.g., Sprott v. Sprott, 233 Va. 238, 355 S.E.2d 881 (1987).
115. Kerr, 6 Va. App. at 625, 371 S.E.2d at 33.
116. Id.
117. 7 Va. App. 36, 371 S.E.2d 816 (1988).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 43, 371 S.E.2d at 819.
120. Id. at 44, 371 S.E.2d at 820. The court restated the general rule that the burden of
proof to prove desertion required evidence of conduct that rendered the marital state intol-
erable and impossible to be endured. Id.
121. Id. at 45, 371 S.E.2d at 821.
122. 7 Va. App. 375, 375 S.E.2d 7 (1988).
123. Id. at 378, 375 S.E.2d at 8.
124. Id. The court clearly stated that mere alcoholism does not justify the departure of
the other spouse. It implied that in presenting a case involving an alcoholic spouse, the
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In Reid v. Reid,12 5 the court of appeals restated the general rule
that the mere gradual breakdown of the marital relationship be-
tween the parties does not justify a spouse's departure from the
marital home. The wife was found to have deserted her husband
based upon the extensive record reviewed by the court.126 The
mere differences in the personalities of the parties and the wife's
unhappiness were insufficient to justify her departure from the
marital home and were not "caused" solely by her husband. 27
The court of appeals analyzed the general rule that a single act
of physical cruelty will not constitute grounds of divorce in Davis
v. Davis. 2s In Davis, the record showed that the wife had previ-
ously deserted the husband. While the parties were separated, the
husband shot the wife in the back, paralyzing her from the waist
down, thus confining her to a wheelchair. 29 The husband asserted
that he could not be guilty of cruelty for misconduct occurring af-
ter the date of separation. 130 The court of appeals disagreed and
held specifically that misconduct in the form of cruelty occurring
while the parties are living separate and apart may constitute
grounds of divorce.' 3' The court further stated that, as applied to
the facts of this case, a single act of physical cruelty may constitute
grounds for a divorce if it is so severe and atrocious as to endanger
life, indicates an intention to do serious bodily harm, causes appre-
hension of serious danger in the future or if the circumstances
show that the acts are likely to be repeated.' 2 Since both parties
were guilty of fault grounds, under the doctrine of recrimination,
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of a no-fault
divorce to the parties. 133
effects of such alcoholism in justifying the departure, for example, physical abuse, extreme
cruelty or conduct adversely affecting the other spouse's mental health, must be presented.
Id. at 379, 375 S.E.2d at 9.
125. 7 Va. App. 553, 375 S.E.2d 533 (1989).
126. Id. at 562, 375 S.E.2d at 538. The court of appeals carefully analyzed the extensive
record in which the wife claimed that her husband was not intimate with her, that the
careers of the parties had caused stress in the marriage, that she felt unhappy and unful-
filled in her role as homemaker, and that she felt her emotional health was in danger. Id. at
561-62, 375 S.E.2d at 538.
127. While assuming that the wife "believed" that her emotional health was endangered,
the court stated that the record did not establish that the "cause" of the breakdown was
due solely to the conduct of husband. Id. at 562, 375 S.E.2d at 538; see also Sprott v. Sprott,
233 Va. 238, 355 S.E.2d 881 (1987) ("one spouse is not legally justified in leaving the other
spouse merely because there has been a gradual breakdown in the marital relationship").
128. 8 Va. App. 12, 377 S.E.2d at 640 (1989).
129. Id. at 14, 377 S.E.2d at 641.
130. Id. at 15, 377 S.E.2d at 642.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 15-17, 377 S.E.2d at 643.
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C. Spousal Support
In Hollowell v. Hollowell,134 the court of appeals ruled that post-
marital conduct, such as illicit sexual relations or cohabitation,
does not terminate spousal support. 13 5 The court further stated
that where changed circumstances are adequately proven, a spouse
is entitled to a consideration of spousal support. In Hollowell, the
spouse, who had previously been awarded spousal support of one
dollar in the final decree, petitioned the court for an increase due
to her disability.18 The court stated that the term "changed cir-
cumstances" has no relevance to post-marital conduct as the term
is contained in section 20-109 of the Code of Virginia, 3 7 rather the
circumstances which justify "an increase, reduction or creation of
spousal support . . . are financial and economic ones.''1 8
In Mallery-Sayre v. Mallery,139 the parties had entered into a
separation agreement providing for a lump-sum spousal support
payment of $100,800 payable in one payment of $10,000, and the
balance payable in 108 installments of $835 per month.14 0 The
agreement was incorporated in the final decree of divorce.' 4 ' The
wife remarried prior to the completion of the payments provided
by the agreement, whereupon husband filed a petition to terminate
the payments. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant-
ing of the petition, ruling that the amount specified, whether clas-
sified as spousal support or property settlement, was a fixed right
and payable regardless of wife's remarriage. 42
The issue of the authority of a juvenile court to modify a prior
134. 6 Va. App. 417, 369 S.E.2d 451 (1988).
135. Id. at 419, 369 S.E.2d at 452.
136. Id.
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
138. Id. The court carefully noted that had the legislature intended illicit cohabitation to
terminate spousal support, it could have so provided in the legislation. Id.
139. 6 Va. App. 471, 370 S.E.2d 113 (1988).
140. Id. at 473, 370 S.E.2d at 115.
141. Id.
142. Id. The court specifically held that sections 20-109 and -109.1 of the Code of Virginia
had no bearing on the award of a lump sum of spousal support for an amount certain which
is due when awarded, but for which the obligation of payment is deferred by future install-
ments. Id. Another factor looked at by the court was the provision of their agreement that
the obligation would survive the death of both parties and be payable to the estate of wife.
Id. at 475, 370 S.E.2d at 116.
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order while the appeal of such order was pending was addressed in
Martin v. Bales.143 In Martin, an order for spousal support was
entered by the juvenile court against the husband, who appealed
the order to the circuit court. 144 The final decree of divorce be-
tween the parties was silent on the issue of spousal support. Pursu-
ant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 145
("URESA"), the wife then filed a petition in New York for spousal
support arrearage. Due to her nonappearance, this petition was
dismissed. However, the wife later filed a direct petition in the dis-
trict court on the issue, which ruled in the husband's favor. The
wife appealed to the circuit court. The court of appeals, in af-
firming the trial court's ruling, held that due to the husband's ini-
tial appeal of the district court order, the juvenile court was with-
out jurisdiction to modify and vacate the spousal support order. 46
The order finding the husband in arrears to the wife was affirmed.
In Goetz v. Goetz,147 the court of appeals held that the Commis-
sioner's conclusion that a wife should file for bankruptcy was an
inappropriate basis for failing to consider the amount of marital
debt in establishing a support award. 148 The case was remanded to
the trial court for proper application of the factors set forth in sec-
tion 20-107.1 of the Code of Virginia' 49 to determine if a lump-sum
award was appropriate. 150
The court of appeals addressed the relationship between the eq-
uitable distribution monetary award of section 20-107.3,'151 and
spousal and child support pursuant to section 20-107.1 and section
20-107.2 of the Code of Virginia. 152 In Kaufman v. Kaufman,153 the
court found that the trial court's award of support without consid-
eration of the income which could result from a possible monetary
143. 7 Va. App. 141, 371 S.E.2d 823 (1988).
144. Id. at 143, 371 S.E.2d at 824.
145. Codified in New York at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 30-43 (McKinney 1988) and in
Virginia at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-88.12 to -88.31 (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
146. 7 Va. App. at 145, 371 S.E.2d at 825-26. The court relied upon section 16.1-298 of the
Code of Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-298 (Repl. Vol. 1988), in recognizing that the filing of
a divorce case divested the juvenile court of any authority to enter any further orders, ex-
cept to enforce its orders entered prior to any circuit court order. 7 Va. App. at 145, 371
S.E.2d at 825-26.
147. 7 Va. App. 50, 371 S.E.2d 567 (1988).
148. Id. at 53, 371 S.E.2d at 568.
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
150. 7 Va. App. at 54, 371 S.E.2d at 569.
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum.. Supp. 1989).
152. Id. § 20-107.2.
153. 7 Va. App. 489, 375 S.E.2d 374 (1988).
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award to which wife would be entitled, was reversible error.15  The
support award should have been made in light of the wife's needs
and the ability of the husband to pay after the monetary award
had been determined. 155
D. Property Settlement Agreements
Prior to the enactment of section 20-155156 of the Code of Vir-
ginia relating to the execution of marital agreements, postnuptial
agreements required consideration and could not be entered into
for the purpose of encouraging or facilitating divorce or separa-
tion. 157 In Dexter v. Dexter,158 the parties entered into a written
marital agreement five days after their marriage, which provided
the wife with $1,000 per month spousal support from the date of
any separation or divorce. 15 9 The parties separated seven years
later and the trial court ruled that the agreement was invalid due
to lack of consideration. 160 The court of appeals affirmed, stating
that to uphold an agreement entered into seven years prior to the
separation between the parties would facilitate divorce,' 6' and that
the issue of spousal support would be controlled solely by the pro-
visions of section 20-107.1.162
The court of appeals provided an exhaustive review of the law
relating to duress, fraud and the unconscionability of a separation
154. Id. at 493-94, 375 S.E.2d at 377.
155. Id.
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-155 (Cum. Supp. 1989). This was an amendment to the Virginia
Premarital Agreement Act, id. §§ 20-147 to -154 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1989), effec-
tive July 1, 1986 which permits contracts relating to spousal support to be entered into
without consideration by parties prior to the marriage of parties. The 1987 amendment per-
mits such contracts to be entered into by married persons to the same extent as prospective
spouses and does not require consideration to support an agreement relating to spousal
support.
157. See Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 378, 219 S.E.2d 901 (1975).
158. 7 Va. App. 36, 371 S.E.2d 816 (1988).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 46, 371 S.E.2d at 821. The court of appeals noted that since the wife had no
further right to spousal support from her prior spouse upon her remarriage, and that no
divorce or separation was anticipated at the time the present agreement was executed, the
wife did not forfeit any right in exchange for the mutual promise contained in the agree-
ment. Thus, there was no consideration to support the agreement. Id. at 47, 371 S.E.2d at
822.
161. Id. The court of appeals indicated that its holding on this issue would have differed
had the agreement been entered into after the date of the enactment of section 20-155 of
the Code of Virginia, which requires no consideration to support its validity. Id.
162. VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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agreement in Derby v. Derby.1 63 In this case, a separation agree-
ment was set aside based upon the unconscionability of its
terms.16 4 The facts showed that the wife had approached her hus-
band with the separation agreement in a parking lot presumably
before her husband had discussed its terms with his attorney. The
agreement contained a gross disparity in the property division
which the court described as "shocking."'16 5 While disagreeing with
the trial court that the agreement was void due to duress, con-
structive fraud or lack of consideration, 6 the court of appeals fo-
cused on the disparity of its terms, especially in light of the wife's
misrepresentation of an adulterous relationship, the wife's "playing
on the weaknesses" of her husband who desired a reconciliation,
the husband's emotional and mental state at the time of its execu-
tion, and the circumstances under which the agreement was pre-
pared, negotiated and executed. 67 The court thus affirmed the
trial court's refusal to validate, ratify or incorporate the agreement
in the divorce decree. 68
E. Child Support
The most significant case relating to child support over the past
year was a reaffirmation of the well established rule in Virginia
that parties cannot contractually modify the terms of child support
without a court order.6 9 In Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, °70 the fa-
163. 8 Va. App. 19, 378 S.E.2d 74 (1989).
164. Id. at 29, 378 S.E.2d at 78-80.
165. Id. at 30, 378 S.E.2d at 80. The trial court had noted that in the agreement, the
husband had essentially given up everything he had earned during his lifetime, and he fur-
ther waived his rights of spousal support against the wife. Id.
166. Id. at 26-28, 378 S.E.2d at 78. The court of appeals noted that there was no evidence
of actual misrepresentation, concealment or deceit to suggest actual fraud. As to construc-
tive fraud, the court restated its holding in Barnes v. Barnes, 231 Va. 39, 340 S.E.2d 803
(1986), that separated spouses owe no fiduciary duty as to disclosure in their negotiations
for a marital agreement. The wife's procurement of the agreement where she knew of the
husband's hope of a reconciliation, and failure to disclose her infidelity, were not acts of
fraud to void the agreement where the agreement, on it face, contained recitals that ac-
knowledged a divorce was pending. 8 Va. App. at 26-28, 378 S.E.2d at 78.
167. Id. at 30-33, 378 S.E.2d at 80-81. The court noted that fraud is determined by re-
viewing the conduct of the parties in relation to their legal and equitable duties towards
each other, while unconscionability is more concerned with the intrinsic fairness of the
terms of an agreement in relation to all attendant circumstances. The court noted that in
the case of marriage and divorce, the relationship is specially susceptible to overreaching
and oppression. Id. at 28, 378 S.E.2d at 78-79.
168. Id. at 33, 378 S.E.2d at 81.
169. See, e.g., Capell v. Capell, 164 Va. 45, 178 S.E.2d 894 (1935); Acree v. Acree, 2 Va.
App. 151, 342 S.E.2d 68 (1986).
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ther was ordered in 1976 to pay child support; the order was in-
creased by the court in 1978. In 1981, the mother moved to Louisi-
ana and wrote the father's attorney relieving him of any support
obligation, whereupon the father stopped paying support. Neither
party petitioned the court for a modification of its order.' 7 In
1987, the wife brought contempt charges against the father for the
arrearage accrued since 1981. The trial court found an arrearage in
favor of the wife, but credited the father with direct payments he
had made on the child's behalf, and for the payments accruing af-
ter the wife's letter to his attorney.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's retroactive modifi-
cation of the support order. 17 2 Consistent with the general rule that
past due support installments become vested as they accrue and
are thereafter immune from change, the court further held that a
party's passive acquiescence in nonpayment of support does not
bar a later claim for support arrearage.'17 The only remedy availa-
ble to a party is to petition the court for a change of the order.'74
The court of appeals carefully distinguished this case from its
holding in Acree v. Acree,'7 5 stating that since no custody change
had been effectuated between the parties, the child had gone with-
out the support originally ordered by the court. The court further
held that the trial court erred in allowing credits for payments
made directly on the child's behalf, stating that such payments are
considered gifts and are not to be credited against support
arrearage.' 7 6
In Anderson v. Van Landingham,7 7 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that the modification of a divorce decree which had pre-
viously incorporated the parties' contractual agreement relating to
170. 7 Va. App. 55, 371 S.E.2d 845 (1988).
171. Id. at 56, 371 S.E.2d at 846.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 58, 371 S.E.2d at 847.
174. Id.
175. 2 Va. App. 151, 342 S.E.2d 68 (1986). In Acree, permanent physical custody of the
child had been transferred to the father. The father's support of his child satisfied the in-
tent of the order of the court, thus relieving the father from his alleged nonperformance of
the strict terms of the order. Id.
176. 7 Va. App. at 59, 371 S.E.2d at 847-48. The court of appeals noted that a payor
cannot vary the terms of a support order to suit his convenience. To do so would lead to
continuous "trouble and turmoil." Id. The lesson of this case is clear to trial practitioners:
payors must strictly pay support in accordance with the terms of the order and if any agree-
ment between the parties is contemplated, get a court order to specifically incorporate these
changes.
177. 236 Va. 85, 372 S.E.2d 137 (1988).
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child support payments, in order to eliminate a requirement for
additional child support payments by the husband, was a modifica-
tion of both the decree and underlying contract. 17 8 The wife's sub-
sequent independent action for support arrearage based on the
contract would, therefore, be dismissed.17
178. Id. at 86, 372 S.E.2d at 138. The Supreme Court of Virginia restated the general rule
that an appropriate court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a decree as to child support,
notwithstanding the existence of a contract between the parents. Id.
179. Id.
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